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 THE ROADS TO REVERSING BREXIT: LOCAL AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
Rob Howse† 
INTRODUCTION 
Support for Brexit as pursued by Prime Minister Theresa May 
is shaky and probably waning. An opinion poll conducted in 
August 2017 suggests that if another referendum on Brexit were to 
occur, the “Remain” side would win it comfortably.1 Moreover, as 
the government has pursued negotiations with Brussels on Brexit, 
its strategy has often been unclear and the “hard Brexit” approach 
of Britain—leaving without retaining access to the single market—
has even less support than the general idea of Brexit and indeed is 
alarming to Britain’s business community.2 If these trends 
continue, and if a deal on Brexit that is acceptable to the majority 
of the public in the United Kingdom (U.K.) becomes ever more 
elusive, then the idea of simply reversing Brexit and stopping the 
process dead in its tracks, will undoubtedly gain traction. 
But is such a reversal constitutionally and legally possible, 
taking into account both formal and informal norms of democracy? 
In this Essay I argue that the answer to that question is a resounding 
“yes”—both under the U.K. and the European Union (E.U.) legal 
and political orders. The Resolution of the European Parliament on 
Brexit Negotiations—voted in early April 2017—indicates that 
reversal of Brexit would occur, from the E.U. perspective, by the 
revocation of notice to leave under Article 503 of the E.U. treaty 
(Treaty of Lisbon).4 The European Parliament (E.P.) suggests that 
“revocation of notification needs to be subject to conditions set by 
all EU-27, so that it cannot be used as a procedural device or 
abused in an attempt to improve on the current terms of the United 
Kingdom’s membership.”5 Two separate points are at issue here. 
First, the E.P. affirms, in suggesting that the revocation of Article 
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 1 See Ben Quinn, Majority of UK Public Backs Brexit ‘Transition Period’, Poll Finds, 
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Lisbon]. 
 5 E.P. Resolution, supra note 3, at L. 
 50 needs to be subject to conditions, that the Treaty of Lisbon itself 
permits such revocation; this is clear from the language of Article 
50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 50 refers to notice of an 
“intention” to withdraw; an intention is far from an irreversible 
decision, simply in terms of the ordinary meaning of words. The 
second point is that the right of revocation cannot be entirely open-
ended as it could then be used or abused in bad faith for strategic 
objectives; thus conditions are needed, to be decided by consensus 
of the other twenty-seven E.U. Member States. The resolution 
implies that, in the absence of such conditions decided by 
consensus (less the U.K.), the right to revoke notice under Article 
50 would be unlimited. 
I.     GETTING BEYOND THE OBJECTIONS TO REVERSAL 
A.     Democracy Is About Changing Your Mind 
One of the most frequently-heard normative arguments 
against the reversal of Brexit (especially through a second 
referendum) is that “democracy” requires no going back once the 
people have spoken. As I shall endeavor to explain, this is a 
concept of democracy that lacks a proper basis either in the ancient 
Greek tradition of direct democracy or in modern Anglo-American 
representative democracy. The idea of the “people” having spoken 
is closely related to a myth that Jan-Werner Mueller has identified 
as at the heart of at least some prominent forms of populist 
ideology—the notion that support of a transitory majority coalition 
represents the backing of the people in the sense of a mythic self-
determining unity, the resistance to which must come necessarily 
from enemies of the people.6 If there is a theoretical source for the 
notion that once the people have spoken there is no turning back, 
it might be the likes of Schmittean decisionism.7 Democracy or 
popular will is epitomized by the decisive historical moment where 
the people, understood as a homogenous unity, turns over its fate 
or destiny to a leader or movement. If democracy is thus 
understood, one can understand the rage of Brexiters when 
confronted with the possibility that constitutional rules, or another 
kind of democratic process (that of representative democracy), or 
even another referendum might interfere with that encounter with 
destiny; or that those outside their understanding of the 
homogenous unity of the people—the likes of Gina Miller or 
Jewish law lords, for instance—would throw a wrench in the 
works. 
 
 6 See generally JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 20 (2016) (“[P]opulists are 
always anti-pluralist; populists claim that they, and only they, represent the people. . . . The 
core claim of populism is . . . a moralized form of anti-pluralism.”). 
 7  CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 49–52 (George Schwab ed. & trans., 2005). 
 When we turn to non-fascistic notions of democracy, 
however, what is remarkable is the common ground that exists 
between ancient direct democracy (by which the referendum 
device is somehow inspired) and modern representative 
democracy: in both instances, democracy is very much about 
changing one’s mind. One of the critiques of elitist and 
conservative elements within Athens of its practice of democracy 
was, in fact, that democracy resulted in the people changing their 
minds and the laws, all the time. In Plato’s Minos, this critique is 
in fact raised by an unnamed interlocutor with somewhat autocratic 
sensibilities, and Socrates responds to it by proposing a definition 
of law as wishing to be what is—the idea that change is a form of 
experimentation in the process of getting a legal-political result 
that best represents the best intentions of the assembly of citizens.8 
A considerably more famous attack on democracy as 
changing one’s mind is relayed in Thucydides’ The History of the 
Peloponnesian Wars.9 In a moment of collective anger, the 
Athenians decide to punish the residents of the island of Mytilene 
for rebelling against Athens’ imperial rule by killing the entire 
adult male population. Then the assembly makes a resolution to 
reconsider that decision through further deliberation. The 
demagogue Cleon is none too happy about the idea of another 
debate; he argues that the people decide best when they do so in 
the heat of passion. Anger is the authentic mode of democratic 
decision, and when the people calm down and listen to the various 
points of view calmly, they easily get taken in by the tricks of 
sophisticated “liberal” orators. In response, the philosophical 
Diodotos, Cleon’s arch protagonist, propounds the reverse (an 
early articulation of the logic of what we would call deliberative 
democracy); people may be more likely to discern the true 
collective interests of a society when assuming a more reflective, 
less reflexive mode. In the end, the majority of Athenians decide 
to spare all but the leaders of the rebellion against Athens. In 
Diodotos’ speech, he presents the human condition as one of 
transgression followed by repentance or reconsideration; this 
provides a deep ground for the idea of democracy as changing 
one’s mind. 
Be that as it may, it is difficult to see—without importing alien 
notions of collective destiny—how the original Brexit referendum 
result must prevail over a later expression of democratic will, 
either through parliament (as long as we are not just talking about 
the unelected upper house), another referendum, or an election. 
That an expression of popular opinion in June 2016 would carry 
more weight than a vote in 2019 once there is, possibly, a 
developed framework for the conditions of Brexit; and thus, much 
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 more information about what it entails seems simply perverse. 
This is not to say that modern representative democracies do 
not make use of hand-tying devices that make it difficult, at least 
in the short term, to reverse certain kinds of democratic outcomes 
that emerge through referenda or other kinds of democratic 
processes (for example, constitutional rules to which onerous 
amendment procedures are attached, or specification in certain 
laws that they can only be altered by super-majority vote). As the 
Supreme Court of the U.K. noted in the R v. Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union (Miller)10 judgment, the U.K. 
Parliament itself had in the past enacted referendum laws that 
provided for some change in the legal situation to be the automatic 
outcome of a positive vote, effectively not permitting backtracking 
(though of course at the limit Parliament could break that promise 
through a further act of Parliament). But, as the Court also 
observed, the 2015 referendum legislation did not provide that any 
set of consequences at all would be triggered automatically by a 
yes vote, nor was there any definition of what yes meant: a bare 
majority of voters or, let’s say, a clear majority (a concept the 
Supreme Court of Canada developed with respect to referenda on 
another kind of fundamental political and constitutional change, 
during the attempted secession of a province from Canada).11 
Parliament might also have prescribed minimum thresholds of 
support that were required in each region of the U.K., or at least in 
England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The 1992 
Canadian Constitutional Referendum was operated against—if not 
a legal requirement at least a clearly enunciated norm—that the 
fundamental constitutional changes being put to a vote would only 
go ahead if there were a majority not only in the country as a 
whole, but in each province of Canada. 
In the case of the Brexit referendum legislation,12 the U.K. 
Supreme Court observed:  
[T]he 2015 Act, which authorised referendums about 
membership of the European Community or European 
Union, made [no] provision for any consequences of 
either possible outcome [of a majority yes or no 
vote]. . . . [T]he 2016 referendum was described as 
advisory by some ministers and as decisive by others, but 
nothing hangs on that for present purposes. Whether or 
not they are clear and consistent, such public 
observations, wherever they are made, are not law: they 
are statements of political intention.13 
In sum, the legal framework and political context of the initial 
 
 10 R v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union (Miller) [2017] UKSC 5, [118]–
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 referendum do not provide for any hand-tying with respect to 
further tests of popular will prior to the final decision to exit the 
E.U. either under an agreement or, after two years, without an 
agreement. 
B.     The Futility of Resisting “History” 
A different sort of objection to any move to reverse Brexit is 
as appealing to the pragmatic sensibility as it is normatively 
slippery. The argument, if I may stylize it thus, is that Brexit—as 
well as Trump and Orban, and certain other developments—reflect 
a shift that it is futile to resist because it is grounded in some deep 
sociological or moral truth that liberals, cosmopolitans, 
Europeanists, whatever one calls us, have been able to avoid facing 
for a long time. Individual rights and cosmopolitan politics are 
flattening. They do not respond to much of what is most powerful 
most of the time in human nature, which is not the demand for 
emancipation, but for organic community and belonging; not 
individual originality and secular struggle for universal equality, 
but for patriotic songs and holy rituals. 
Among anti-liberals, Carl Schmitt at least had a certain 
probity. He confessed that it boils down to anthropological 
confessions of faith—how one understands humankind, as capable 
of an (albeit often interrupted) emancipatory trajectory toward 
universal humanity, or as fearful, anxious, and seeking protection 
and security within the comfort of the closed group, ideally under 
the wing of a strong State and its strong leaders.14 If one has the 
latter confession of faith, then it is logical to see a phenomenon 
such as Brexit as a confirmation of one’s predetermined 
understanding of the human condition as a means by which the 
permanent order of things has revealed itself in the face of liberal 
cosmopolitan delusions. To resist Brexit, to try actually to reverse 
it, is to deny historical truth—Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson as 
evangeloi.15 
Indeed, Damon Linker goes so far as to say as that with Brexit 
and Trump, human nature has revealed itself.16 But the contrary 
evidence is clear: whether with Brexit or Trump, the reactionary 
xenophobic vision is one that does not catch on with young people 
in the Anglo-American world—the rising generation of democratic 
citizens. Why judge human nature by the weight of the past—the 
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 16 See Damon Linker, How Brexit Shattered Progressives’ Dearest Illusions, WEEK (June 
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 old—rather than the promise of the future—the young? As Leo 
Strauss noted in his great work on Machiavelli, modern political 
thought as progressive thought has always pinned its hopes on the 
young.17 
One can also view non-reversibility as taking the side of 
history in a sense that history is pointing to some malaise or 
perhaps incurable pathology of the E.U. itself. But what is this 
malaise? Is it bureaucracy; is it lack of energizing passion and 
commitment to ideals; or is it rather, a crisis of neoliberalism 
(austerity, the ascendency of German economics, etc.)? The former 
communitarian view is reflected in, for example, the work of 
Alexander Somek.18 One would give some precedence to the crisis 
of neoliberalism, the immense human cost and waste of human 
opportunity produced by the punitive German style of neoliberal 
economics. A good social democrat would say yes there is fear, 
but fear is produced not by ontological anxiety, but the hollowing 
out of the social contract and the erosion of the rights provided by 
the welfare state. Had the left been mobilized with full solidarity 
behind the Remain in the Brexit referendum campaign, the overall 
result might have been different; the ambivalence of the left, 
arguably fateful in the short term, again would show that 
underlying the present moment might well be the crisis of 
neoliberalism as the dominant orientation of the E.U., rather than 
the proto-cosmopolitan, post-national ideal of Europe as such. In 
sum, only a shallow or self-serving analysis of the present moment 
could lead to the conclusion that history has stacked the cards in 
favor of the Brexiters. 
C.     The Value of Certainty and Stability 
Quite aside from the supposed futility of countering the forces 
of history (rather than trying to accommodate or work with them) 
is another pragmatic notion: we need to move on for the sake of 
certainty and stability. This is perhaps the most dangerous 
objection to reversing Brexit in that it appeals to the values of many 
of those who have been attracted to Remain. If one’s case for 
Remain was the dangers of upsetting the status quo and entering 
uncharted waters, one might think that the Burkean institutional 
conservative view is now on the side of the Brexiters—the U.K. 
having already moved to the stage of triggering Article 50. One 
might think of Kant’s attitude to the French Revolution: he was 
ostensibly horrified by the idea of revolution, but once a revolution 
succeeds (at least of the liberal kind) he thought one needs to 
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 welcome it as the new legitimate order.19 There are doubtless 
deeper subtleties grounding Kant’s position. Be that as it may, the 
key point must be that the notion of a new status quo of Brexit is 
largely an illusion and indeed a dangerous one. There is persistent 
disagreement, even at the highest levels of the May government 
and the ruling Conservative party, about what Brexit should look 
like and what kind of future for Britain it implies. This is not 
merely the difficulty in constructing a negotiating position for talks 
with Brussels or mastering the technical questions entailed in a 
complex and unprecedented transition. It is about the priorities, 
goals, and values that are being pursued through Brexit, around 
which there is no consensus at any level. We must remember that 
for then British Prime Minister David Cameron, the referendum 
may have been, to some real extent, a deus ex machina for political 
dissensus around the future place of Britain in Europe and the 
world.20 The result in no way ended the dissensus. At the current 
moment in the Brexit process, one cannot do better than the words 
of Lord Bolingbroke (of another century): “I expect little from the 
actors that tread the stage at present. They are divided, not so much 
as it has seemed, and as they would have it believed, about 
measures; the true division is about their different ends.”21 
In sum there is no new status quo to accept, however 
reluctantly and regrettably, for the sake of stability or certainty. 
And it must be clearly understood that the U.K. remains fully in 
the E.U. (with the main exception being for participation in 
processes related to the formulation of the E.U. position on Brexit 
itself) until the effective date of an agreement on Brexit or, in the 
absence of an agreement or an extension of the negotiation process, 
until withdrawal without an agreement just under two years hence. 
Given the above-noted uncertainty about what the top political 
circles in Britain seek in the way of a post-Brexit outcome, as well 
as the range of political events that might affect Europe in coming 
months or years, there is really no applecart to upset in returning 
to a status quo ante (E.U. membership) that, as a 
legal/constitutional matter, has yet to be disrupted. The Brexiters 
present Brexit as a process that is well-underway to its pre-
determined conclusion. In fact, despite all the posturing about 
starting talks on post-Brexit trade agreements, the vague white 
paper on the Great Repeal Bill and so forth, no process has yet 
really begun. 
 
 19 See Sidney Axinn, Kant, Authority, and the French Revolution, 32 J. HIST. IDEAS 423 
(1971). 
 20 See generally Steven Erlanger & Stephen Castle, In ‘Brexit’ Vote, David Cameron 
Faces Problem of His Own Making, N.Y. TIMES, (June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/22/world/europe/david-cameron-brexit-european-union.html. 
 21 HENRY ST. JOHN BOLINGBROKE, LETTERS, ON THE SPIRIT OF PATRIOTISM: ON THE 
IDEA OF A PATRIOT KING: AND ON THE STATE OF PARTIES, AT THE ACCESSION OF KING 
GEORGE THE FIRST (1749). 
 II.     OPPORTUNITIES FOR REVERSING BREXIT: THE U.K. AND 
E.U. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
A.     The Significance of Miller 
In Miller, the petitioners succeeded before the U.K. Supreme 
Court in establishing that Brexit entailed the legal change of a 
constitutional character and that under the U.K. constitutional 
framework, the ultimate control over such a process must rest with 
Parliament and not the government (although Parliament can by 
legislation delegate explicitly to the government particular actions 
in this process).22 It was largely uncontroversial in Miller that, 
eventually, Parliament would have to act to change legislation that 
presupposed the U.K.’s continued membership in the E.U. But the 
Brexiters conceived this role as a matter of a housekeeping 
exercise once the government had signed off on all the important 
decisions in the Brexit process, and Brexit was a full faith 
accomplice, as it were. In Miller, the explicit claim of the 
petitioners was: given that Brexit, if achieved, must contemplate 
legal changes of a constitutional character, the very triggering of 
Article 50 must be authorized by a law of Parliament.23 The 
Supreme Court, in a majority decision, accepted this argument. For 
some, this must have seemed a pyrrhic victory, since as a political 
matter Parliament was not going to block the government from 
triggering Article 50. And indeed, Parliament passed the needed 
law (the Court said it could be quite laconic and still be 
constitutionally adequate) authorizing the triggering of Article 50. 
But the Court did not say that the constitutional principle that 
it recognized is exhausted in practical significance once Parliament 
authorizes by law the government to trigger Article 50. It could 
equally apply—if not even more emphatically—I would argue, to 
subsequent decisions about Brexit of equal or greater 
constitutional significance: should Parliament not have to debate 
and authorize by law the formal negotiating position of the 
government with the European institutions, and indeed authorize 
by law any agreement resulting from the negotiations, and 
certainly, any decision to proceed to Brexit without an agreement? 
In the court of first instance, the petitioners’ counsel had urged the 
“bullet” theory: the reason that the initial step triggering Article 50 
required authorization by Parliament was that it is like pulling a 
trigger on a gun, once the trigger is pulled the bullet cannot be 
stopped.24 In other words, this would be Parliament’s only 
opportunity to meaningfully direct a process, the inevitable result 
of, which would be legal change of a constitutional character. But 
significantly, the bullet theory played no role whatever in the legal 
 
 22 Miller [2017] UKSC 5 [46] (appeals taken from Eng. & N. Ir.). 
 23 Id. [36]. 
 24 Id. 
 reasoning of the Supreme Court. When we turn to the resulting 
legislation, it is limited to the authorization of the government to 
trigger Article 50, but this is where the delegation to the 
government also ends. The Act in no way hands over all further 
consequent decisions about Brexit to the government; thus, on the 
principle enunciated by the Supreme Court there would be good 
arguments that the law-making authority of Parliament must be 
employed in the case of later decisions with weighty implications 
for legal change of a constitutional character. I would think this 
would, above all, be the case for decisions about the form of Brexit 
that affect the rights of individuals under existing laws of a 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional character. Finally, with all 
due respect to Lord Pannick, whose advocacy I admire greatly, the 
bullet theory depends on an erroneous reading of Article 50. 
Article 50 provides ample means to stop, slow down, suspend, or 
delay the process begun by the U.K. giving notice; though in 
fairness to Lord Pannick, it is debatable to what extent the U.K. 
can take any of these steps unilaterally once Article 50 is triggered. 
It is to Article 50 that we now turn.25 
B.     The E.U. Constitutional Framework: Article 50 of the 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Article 50 reads as follows: 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the 
Union in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements. 
 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall 
notify the European Council of its intention. In the light 
of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the 
Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with 
that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its 
future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall 
be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It 
shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament. 
 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in 
question from the date of entry into force of the 
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the 
notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the 
European Council, in agreement with the Member State 
concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. 
 
 25  Id. 
  
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of 
the European Council or of the Council representing the 
withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the 
discussions of the European Council or Council or in 
decisions concerning it. 
 
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with 
Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to 
rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure 
referred to in Article 49.26 
Reading paragraphs one and two together, it is clear that in order 
for a notification under Article 50 to be valid, a Member State must 
have already made a decision in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements to leave the E.U. One may question 
whether, in light of the constitutional principle enunciated by the 
Supreme Court, a valid decision to leave the E.U. has been 
properly taken by the U.K. The law authorizing the government to 
trigger Article 50 does not decide that the U.K. shall leave the E.U. 
Parliament has not explicitly decided that question. 
Be that as it may, paragraph two outlines a process for 
negotiating an agreement with the withdrawing state that entails 
several steps: the formulation of guidelines by the European 
Council; the determination of a framework for the withdrawing 
state’s future relationship with the E.U.; the negotiation of an 
agreement based on that framework; the consent of the European 
Parliament to the agreement reached; and, once that consent is 
granted, the approval of the European Council.27 Now we come to 
paragraph three, which provides that, failing an agreement, the 
withdrawal of the State in question becomes effective two years 
after it gave notice under Article 50.28 However, by unanimous 
consent of the other E.U. Member States and the withdrawing 
State, this can be postponed. 
It should be noted, first of all, that the two-year period relates 
only to the scenario where there is no agreement. Where there is a 
withdrawal agreement, the date that the withdrawal agreement is 
effective is a matter for negotiation. In theory, the withdrawal 
agreement could be set, for example, a year or more after the 
agreement is reached. This would allow more time for deliberation 
on the agreement and, in the U.K., for reopening the question of 
Brexit itself in light of the information revealed by the terms of the 
agreement. It would also allow for the process by which 
Parliament, as argued in the earlier section, would authorize by law 
 
 26 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 4. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 the government to bind the U.K. to the agreement. 
What of the case of revocation of the notice of withdrawal, 
which would seem on many scenarios a necessary instrumentality 
for the halting or reversal of Brexit? First of all, let’s consider 
revocation prior to reaching an agreement and prior to the end of 
the two-year period. In the words of Jean-Claude Piris, a former 
senior legal official of the E.U., the “Article 50 procedure provides 
for notification by the interested state only of its ‘intention’ to 
leave. . . . In law, the word ‘intention’ cannot be interpreted as a 
final and irreversible decision. Legally, you may withdraw an 
intention, or change it, or transform it into a decision.”29 A stronger 
turn of phrase would be needed to imply a commitment that could 
not be reversed, at least without the consent of others affected by 
it. Since Article 50 does not contain any lex specialis concerning 
the issue of revocation of the notice of withdrawal, we would 
logically turn to the default rules in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.30 These rules do not contain any suggestion that 
a State’s notice of intent to withdraw from a treaty is irrevocable 
(that is, unless the other parties to the treaty consent to the 
revocation). As noted at the outset of this Essay, the European 
Parliament in its recent resolution has stipulated that conditions 
could, and should, be put on revocation by unanimous consent of 
the twenty-seven E.U. Member States less the U.K.31 As the 
present analysis suggests, the legal basis for imposition of such 
conditions is to be found neither in the text of Article 50, nor in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
What about revocation after the end of the two-year period? 
As noted, Article 50 explicitly provides for the possibility that the 
two-year period for automatic withdrawal failing an agreement 
may be extended by unanimous consent of the European Council 
and the withdrawing state. It has been widely noted that (up to the 
time of this Essay going to press) progress in the Brexit 
negotiations has been slow, with impasses on many key issues. At 
some point the actors involved will be faced with the very real 
possibility of withdrawal into a legal black hole if the period is not 
extended, perhaps even for another year or eighteen months. While 
it is possible to imagine a scenario of such impasse and acrimony 
that there is a lack of unanimity to extend, under most 
circumstances the pressure to extend would be enormous. As for 
the U.K. side, based upon the constitutional principle in Miller a 
decision to, in effect, embrace Brexit without an agreement—an 
outcome that would be clearly fraught with serious, if not grave 
consequences for the rule of law and the orderly operation of the 
legal and constitutional framework—would need, arguably, the 
 
 29 Jean-Claude Piris, Article 50 Is Not For Ever and the UK Could Change Its Mind, FIN. 
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/b9fc30c8-6edb-11e6-a0c9-
1365ce54b926. 
 30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 31 See E.P. Resolution, supra note 3. 
 authorization of Parliament by statute. If there were an extension 
of the two-year period to allow the orderly completion of all the 
steps required to get to the conclusion of an agreement—and that 
I think is the most likely outcome—then the same principles would 
continue to apply to revocation as did within the two-year period. 
It is fully permissible. 
What if the U.K. were to decide to reverse Brexit after an 
agreement was concluded, but before it entered into force? 
Pursuant to Article 50, paragraph five, in this scenario the U.K. 
would arguably have to reenter the E.U. under Article 49.32 But 
clearly, the procedures in Article 49 presume the need for a legal 
transition.33 The withdrawal agreement not yet having entered into 
force, there is no transition to manage as the status quo of E.U. 
membership is still intact. So the withdrawal agreement might 
simply be terminated or the U.K. might withdraw from the 
withdrawal agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Those of us who oppose Brexit on the merits need not, and 
must not, accept a presumption—normative, practical, or legal—
against the reversibility of the current government’s choice to seek 
the exit of the U.K. from the E.U. Neither the referendum result, 
nor the giving of notice under Article 50, nor indeed any valid 
decision of any legal or political authority, either in the U.K. or in 
the E.U., justifies such a presumption. To reverse Brexit will 
require a new political situation and extraordinary political 
entrepreneurship and leadership, but the opportunity is there. It is 
our duty to do all that is possible to make the current process as 
slow as it can be, to demand the maximum involvement of 
legislatures, and to use every legal and procedural device to string 
it out until the required political entrepreneurship and leadership 
emerges. Not to make this effort is to betray the rising generation 
of U.K. citizens, who en masse do not want this madness and will 
pay the largest price if it is not stopped. 
 
 32  See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 4, at art. 50(5). 
 33  See id. at art. 49. Article 49 reads: 
Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is 
committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The 
European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. 
The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act 
unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the 
European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component 
members. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which 
the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an 
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall 
be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by 
the European Council shall be taken into account. 
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